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ABSTRACT
A central point in the recent debate about Social Security in the United States has been the extent
to which the federal government should take significant positions in the equity market. But, as this
paper shows, the government already has a much more significant, if implicit position in the U.S.
equity market through its claim to future tax revenues. Using estimates of the sensitivity of federal
tax revenues to stock market returns, I calculate the implicit equity position of the federal
government, defined as the equity position that would be as sensitive to the stock market as the
present value of federal revenues. Although standard errors are large, point estimates indicate that
the implicit federal equity position exceeds the size of the stock market itself, a result that is
consistent with the fact that revenues from all sources, not just taxes on corporate source income,
are responsive to stock market returns.
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auerbach@econ.berkeley.eduA central point in the recent debate about Social Security in the United States has been the extent 
to which the federal government should take significant positions in the equity market. During 
the Clinton administration, for example, a Social Security advisory council presented three 
proposals to improve the system’s financial stability (U.S. Social Security Administration, 1997), 
one of which would have involved shifting a portion of the OASDI trust fund into corporate 
equity. Opponents argued that government ownership of equity would endanger the capital 
market and that the use of risky investments to sustain future benefits would implicitly commit 
the government to raise taxes on future workers if investment yields fell short of expectations. 
  But, as this paper shows, the government already has a much more significant, if implicit 
position in the U.S. equity market through its claim to future tax revenues. There are differences, 
of course, between implicit and explicit equity ownership. For example, an income tax does not 
apply selectively to particular companies or carry voting rights. But these differences can be 
overstated; a government may meddle in the equity market, but it may also change tax rules. 
  To get a sense of how large government’s implicit equity claim might be, consider a 
proportional tax, τ , on all capital income. The government’s right to this fraction of all capital 
income gives it τ /(1-τ ) of the income stream received by private owners of capital. If all such 
capital is held via the stock market, then government would have an implicit equity stake equal 
to τ /(1-τ ) of stock market value. A tax rate of 25 percent, for example, would make the 
government’s equity claim one-third of the private stock market value. This simple calculation, 
though, likely understates the government’s implicit claim. Much of the government’s tax 
revenue comes from labor income or capital income outside the publicly traded sector, each 
stream likely correlated with corporate sector returns. Thus, the government’s claim could be 
several times the size of the stock market. For example, if all income shocks were perfectly   2
correlated, half of all capital income were received from sources other than the stock market, and 
labor income were three times the size of capital income, then stock market income would equal 
1/6 of all income subject to the income taxation, so that a 25 percent income tax would provide 
an implicit equity claim equal to twice (6 x .25/.75) the explicit value of the stock market. 
Measuring the Government’s Equity Position 
Before calculating this implicit equity position, one must confront some theoretical issues. First, 
the tax structure itself is subject to change, and this leads to an ambiguity in defining the implicit 
equity position at any given time. For example, suppose that the government must raise a fixed 
amount of revenue each year that does not vary with economic circumstances, and uses an 
income tax to raise this revenue. As income fluctuates, government offsets the change in revenue 
that would result by raising the income tax rate when income declines and lowering the tax rate 
when income falls. Is it appropriate in this case to say that government’s revenue stream is 
deterministic and free of risk? If we seek to understand the risk characteristics associated with 
the tax structure, rather than with observed tax revenues, we should hold the tax structure 
constant in performing the calculation. 
  Second, as there is no market for a right to tax revenues, how can we estimate the 
government’s implicit equity claim, under a given tax structure? This is the heart of the exercise 
performed below. Taking the government’s overall “asset position” as the present value of its 
current and future revenues, we ask how this present value is affected by a contemporaneous 
change in the stock market. We then ask how large a share of private equity the government 
would have to hold in order for its wealth to change by the same amount, and define this to be 
the government’s implicit equity position. This definition of government’s equity position relates 
to risk, not value, telling us how much equity would have the same volatility as the government’s   3
position. This need not equal the present value of the government’s revenue stream. The two 
measures would coincide if government revenues were some proportion of corporate revenues 
(as in the first example above), but this will not be the case more generally. Given our interest in 
the government’s risk exposure, the risk-based measure seems more appropriate. 
 Let  Xt be the level of government revenue in year t, and define  ) / ln( 1 − = t t t X X x as the 
proportional change in Xt from year t-1 to year t. Let rt be the proportional stock market return 
over the same period, also defined using logarithms. To purge the calculated revenue change of 
tax law changes in response to contemporaneous stock market returns, let  ) / ln( 1 1 − − = t t t t X X x  be 
the change in revenue between years t-1 and t that would have occurred had the year t-1 tax law 
applied in both years. To determine the impact of the stock market on government revenues at 
date t, we specify the equation, 
(1)   t n t n t t m t m t t r r r x x x ε γ γ γ β β α + + + + + + + + = − − − − Κ Κ 1 1 0 1 1  
where m and n are the number of lags for revenue growth and stock market returns, respectively.
1   
The lag structure of expression (1) permits a flexible impact of current changes in the 
stock market on future levels of revenue. This makes sense given the various channels through 
which the market affects revenue (which we do not attempt to distinguish). For example, we 
might expect capital gains tax collections to surge for a number of years after an initial shock to 
the market, because of delays in realizations; to the extent that revenue shocks are associated 
with anticipated changes in profits, revenues needn’t immediately reflect the rise in the market. 
  Using the coefficients from (1), one can estimate the impact of a stock market shock at 
date t on revenue growth from date t onward.
2  Letting as be the impact on  s t x +  of a unit shock to 
                                                 
1 If revenue and the value of the stock market were cointegrated, then it would be appropriate to 
include an error correction term in (1) to represent the long-run relationship between the two 
variables. However, various tests indicated that the variables were not cointegrated.   4
the return rt after s periods, we have (for lag structure (m,n) = (1,1), which turns out to be a 
preferred specification using annual data): 
(2)   a0 = γ 0 ;  a1 = γ 1 + β 1a0 ;  as = β 1as-1 , ∀  s > 1, 
which we may use to calculate the cumulative effect, bs, on the logarithm of revenues at date s+t,  
(3)   b0 = a0 ;   bs = as + bs-1 , ∀  s > 0. 
We would expect the terms as to converge to zero after a time, and the terms bs to converge to 
some constant value, representing the long-run percentage increase in revenues resulting from a 
one-time unit increase in the stock market. As a one-time shock to rt represents a permanent 
increase in asset prices, there is no reason for this long-run value of b to be zero.  For example, a 
one-time increase in the level of productivity ought to have a permanent effect on revenue.   
The terms bs provide estimates of the impact on revenues at each date s≥  t of a stock 
market shock at t. Let ρ  be the appropriate real government discount rate
3. The present value 
change in revenue associated with a unit increase in rt is then: 
(4)   b 0Xt + b1Xt+1/(1+ρ ) + b2Xt+2/(1+ρ )
2 + …, 
where Xt+s is the baseline level of revenue in period t+s.  If we assume that baseline revenue 
grows at a constant real rate, g, then expression (4) becomes 
(5)   b0 Xt + b1Xt(1+g)/(1+ρ ) + b2Xt(1+g)
2/(1+ρ )
2 + … 
=  Xt [b0 + b1(1+g)/(1+ρ ) + b2 (1+g)
2/(1+ρ )
2 + …], 
so that the present value impact relative to current revenue Xt is, simply: 
(6)   θ  = [b0 + b1 (1+g)/(1+ρ ) + b2 (1+g)
2/(1+ρ )
2 + …]. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 This calculation assumes that a stock market shock at date t has no direct impact on stock 
market returns at subsequent dates. 
3 For simplicity, the discount rate is assumed here to be constant.   5
With this variable calculated, we are now in a position to determine the government’s 
implicit equity share. A unit increase in the stock market at date t increases the present value of 
revenues by θ Xt. The same increase raises the value of the stock market as a whole by Vt, where 
Vt is the market’s capitalized value. Thus, the increase in the government’s revenues has the 
same present value as it would if the government received no tax revenues at all, but held a 
fraction θ Xt/Vt of the stock market, or stock valued at θ Xt. 
Data 
Given the form in which revenue data are available, we work with annual data for fiscal years, 
with the stock market returns measured over the same period. The main data source for 
government revenues is various publications of the Congressional Budget Office. To calculate 
period t revenues under period t-1’s tax law, t-1Xt, we subtract from actual revenues in period t 
the CBO estimates during year t of the cumulative impact of legislation on revenues in that fiscal 
year.
4 In cases where components of revenue, such as individual income tax receipts, are being 
considered, the standard CBO publications must occasionally be supplemented by other 
materials describing the components of tax legislation, although breakdowns are generally 
available except where the legislative effects on revenue are quite small.
5 Unfortunately, 
complete estimates of the impact of legislation on current-year revenues are available only going 
back to fiscal year 1985, which leaves us with relatively short time series. Thus, we also consider 
estimates of equation (1) using the actual growth in revenues, xt, rather than the constant-law 
growth in revenues,  t x , which allows estimation over a much longer sample period. 
                                                 
4 CBO’s periodic updates break down revenue changes among “technical”, “economic” and 
“legislative” factors. Our correction subtracts all current-year legislative changes. 
5 Details of how these corrections are computed are available upon request.   6
  Fiscal year stock returns are based on the value weighted total (NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ) market, from the CRSP Indices database. Revenues and stock returns are deflated 
with the GDP deflator; the estimated equation relates real revenue growth to real stock returns. 
Results 
Table 1 presents estimates of equation (1), using actual revenue growth, for fiscal years 1949-
2002, for both total federal revenue and its major components.
6 The number of lags for the model 
was chosen using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion, although similar results followed 
from the use of alternative criteria.
7 The estimates suggest that total revenues rise immediately in 
response to a stock market shock, and then continue to rise more rapidly, with the impact 
converging rapidly to about .22 percent of revenue for each one-time, percentage point stock 
market increase. The estimated sensitivity is greater for personal income taxes, at .35 percent of 
revenue, and largest for corporate income taxes, with an implied long-run response of just over .4 
percent per percent increase.  For all other categories of taxes, the sensitivity is quite small. 
  The bottom part of Table 1 presents estimates of θ , based on expression (6), for an 
assumed real growth rate of 3 percent and alternative real discount rates of 3.5, 6, and 9 percent, 
respectively. Also included for each estimate are 95-percent confidence intervals.
8 Recall that θ , 
multiplied by the level of revenue, provides an estimate of the implicit equity holdings associated 
with this particular revenue source. The estimates of θ  are consistent with the long-run annual 
responses just discussed. They are also very sensitive to the choice of discount rate, particularly 
                                                 
6 The starting date was chosen to exclude World War II from the data, and to accommodate 
sufficient revenue lags in choosing the appropriate specification. 
7 For all but the Social Insurance equation, the (1,1) specification was found to be optimal.  For 
that equation, the (3,1) specification was found to be slightly better, but I present the (similar) 
results for the (1,1) specification to preserve comparability with other estimates. 
8 These intervals are calculated by taking 1000 random draws from the estimated joint 
distribution of the parameter estimates.   7
at low levels of the discount rate. This is a consequence of the fact that the estimated impact on 
revenue is permanent, so that θ  becomes very large as the discount rate converges to the growth 
rate. For the intermediate discount rate assumption of ρ  = .06, the estimate for total revenues is 
7.5, meaning that a 1-percent shock to the stock market raises the present value of revenue by 7.5 
percent of current revenue. Based on the nonfinancial corporate sector’s 2002 equity value of 
about $7.8 trillion (Federal Reserve Board, 2003, Table B.102) and fiscal year 2002 federal 
revenues of $1.9 trillion, this implies a federal implicit equity holding of 1.8 times the entire 
value of the stock market! Even though the corporate income tax is estimated to be the most 
responsive to stock prices, it accounts for only about 15 percent of the government’s implicit 
equity because it is such a small share of federal revenue. 
  As discussed above, point estimates of this magnitude are plausible. On the other hand, 
the 95 percent confidence intervals are quite broad. For example, the lower bound of the interval 
for all revenues is just under 50 percent of equity, compared to the point estimate of 180 percent.  
However, even half of the stock market is quite large in comparison to the shares commonly 
discussed in the context of trust fund investment. By comparison, the total combined OASDI 
trust fund at the end of 2002 was roughly $1.4 trillion, or about 18 percent the size of the stock 
market, and proposals have generally been to invest only a fraction of the trust fund in equity, 
representing perhaps 5 percent of the total stock market’s capitalization. 
  The preceding calculations are all based on estimates of the responsiveness of actual 
revenue to the stock market. As discussed above, one might wish to adjust revenue changes to 
exclude the effects of contemporaneous legislation, to measure the responsiveness of tax revenue 
inherent in the tax rules themselves. Given the short time period for which such adjusted revenue 
data are available, it is difficult to obtain robust estimates of the equation (1). We do not attempt   8
to determine the number of lags of revenue and stock returns to be included in the estimated 
equations, but simply use the specification generally preferred for the previous estimates, (m,n) = 
(1,1). The resulting values of θ   (for a real discount rate of ρ  = .06) implied by these estimates, 
along with 95-percent confidence intervals, are displayed in Table 2. To see the importance of 
the adjustment to revenue, the table presents estimates based on unadjusted revenue data 
(comparable to those figures presented in Table 1) as well. 
  This adjustment has virtually no impact for overall revenues, suggesting that which way 
we choose to measure the riskiness of the government’s tax position may not be that important 
and that the more precise results obtained from the longer, unadjusted time series in Table 1 may 
suffice. For some disaggregated categories, particularly corporate tax revenues, the impact of the 
adjustment is larger. Somewhat surprisingly, the impact often is to reduce the implied sensitivity 
of revenue to the stock market. That is, the legislative terms being excluded by the adjustment 
augment the responsiveness of revenues to the stock market. If unexpected increases in revenues 
led to tax cuts, one would have expected the opposite effect. But these adjustments take into 
account only current-year revenue effects, which might behave differently, and the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable that is also adjusted makes the interpretation more difficult. Also, 
given the wide and overlapping confidence intervals for these estimates, it is probably wise not 
to make too much of these differences. 
  In general, the picture conveyed by the results in Table 2 is similar to that of Table 1.  
Social Insurance, Excise and Other Taxes have small and insignificant responses to the stock 
market, while personal income taxes are somewhat more responsive than total revenues, with 
both measures somewhat more responsive than in Table 1. The estimates for corporate income 
taxes are quite volatile and strongly influenced by the adjustment term, highlighting the difficulty   9
of obtaining robust estimates from such a short sample, particularly for so volatile a series.  Still, 
if one focuses on aggregate revenues, the results appear to confirm the findings from Table 1, 
that there is a wide range possible for the implicit equity position of the federal government, but 
with a lower bound that still represents a large fraction of privately held equity. 
Conclusions 
The federal government holds little equity directly, but the sensitivity of federal revenue to the 
stock market is quite large. In light of the empirical estimates presented here, it is important that 
policies to increase direct government investment in equities be evaluated taking into account the 
government’s existing implicit equity position.   
   10
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Table 1 
Revenue Growth and Stock Market Returns (1949-2002) 
 









     
Constant 0.012  0.002 0.050 -0.021 0.006  0.032
 (0.011)  (0.014) (0.012) (0.025) (0.016)  (0.014)
         
Revenue (-1)  0.181  0.279 0.129 0.027 0.030  -0.175
 (0.131)  (0.136) (0.137) (0.129) (0.141)  (0.130)
         
Return   0.018  0.081 -0.009 0.033 -0.038  -0.021
 (0.043)  (0.055) (0.038) (0.106) (0.069)  (0.055)
        
Return (-1)  0.162  0.173 0.065 0.360 0.038  0.173
 (0.043)  (0.054) (0.038) (0.108) (0.071)  (0.057)
         
2 R   0.188 0.179 0.013 0.132 -0.045 0.161
 
Real Discount Rate:    Implied values of θ    
3.5% 44.5  71.5 13.0 82.1 0.1  26.3
  (12.0, 2.0)  (24.3,147.7) (-13.0, 1.9) (18.3, 65.0) (-43.8,46.2)  (-1.7, 57.5)
    
6% 7.5  12.1 2.2 13.9 0.0  4.4
  (2.0, 15.4)  (4.1, 24.6) (-2.2, 7.1) (3.0, 27.8) (-7.5, 7.8)  (-0.3, 9.7)
    
9% 3.7  6.0 1.1 7.0 0.0  2.2
  (1.0, 7.6)  (2.0, 12.2) (-1.2, 3.5) (1.4, 13.9) (-3.8, 3.9)  (-0.2, 4.96)
 
Table 2 
Estimates of θ   (1986-2002; ρ  = .06) 
 
Total   Pers. Income  Soc. Insurance Corp. Income Excise  Other
Unadjusted 
11.3 18.1  2.8 17.8 -2.9  8.3
(6.9, 21.2)  (10.5, 39.7)  (-0.2, 9.0) (2.5, 33.8) (-22.0, 10.1)  (-0.2, 18.5)
    
Adjusted 
11.3 16.0  2.9 1.5 2.3  7.0
(6.1, 24.9)  (9.3, 31.1)  (0.1, 8.5) (-19.5, 20.1) (-15.8, 22.3)  (-1.4, 16.9)
 